Statement of the Case.

In the recent cause of Frick v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 119 Atl. 229, instituted to enforce an Iowa judgment (179 Iowa, 149) against petitioner based upon facts essentially like those here disclosed, the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered the precise point now urged upon us. In harmony with Dresser v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., 80 Conn. 681, 709, it held that the membership certificate constituted a contract not to demand of the assured more than \$2.68 per thousand for any mortuary assessment; and also that the jurisdiction of the Iowa court to render judgment for excess payments was clear.

Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs, 237 U. S. 662, is not in point. That controversy related to the effect of the decree in Dresser v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., supra, a class suit instituted to determine the status and proper use of the mortuary fund. The causes now under consideration present no such problem.

The judgments below are

Affirmed.

GREAT LAKES DREDGE & DOCK COMPANY v. KIEREJEWSKI, ADMINISTRATRIX OF KIERE-JEWSKI.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 633. Argued February 27, 1923.—Decided April 9, 1923.

The District Court has admiralty jurisdiction over a libel to recover damages, in accordance with a local death statute, for a death occurring on navigable waters while the decedent was there performing maritime service to a completed vessel afloat, and occasioned by a tort then and there committed. P. 480. Affirmed.

ERROR to a judgment of the District Court recovered by the defendant in error in her libel for damages for the death of her husand. Mr. George Clinton, Jr., with whom Mr. Ulysses S. Thomas was on the briefs, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Irving W. Cole for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the Court.

The sole question propounded upon this direct writ of error is whether the District Court rightly held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the libel by which defendant in error sought to recover damages for the death of her husband. 280 Fed. 125.

Plaintiff in error, a corporation engaged in dredging, pile driving, etc., maintains a yard at Buffalo, New York, and also keeps there scows and tugs. Leo Kierejewski, a master boiler maker, was employed by it to perform services as called upon. Acting under this employment, he began to make repairs upon a scow moored in the navigable waters of Buffalo River. He stood upon a scaffold resting upon a float alongside. One of the Company's tugs came near, negligently agitated the water, swamped the float and precipitated him into the stream where he drowned.

While performing maritime service to a completed vessel afloat, he came to his death upon navigable waters as the result of a tort there committed. The rules of the maritime law supplemented by the local death statute applied and fixed the rights and liabilities of the parties. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233.

"The general doctrine that in contract matters admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the transaction and in tort matters upon the locality, has been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as settled." Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 476.

In the cause last cited neither Rohde's general employment nor his activities had any direct relation to navigaSyllabus.

tion or commerce—the matter was purely local—and we were of opinion that application of the state statute, as between the parties, would not work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law or interfere with its proper harmony or uniformity.

Here the circumstances are very different. Not only was the tort committed and effective on navigable waters, but the rights and liabilities of the parties are matters which have direct relation to navigation and commerce. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255; State Industrial Commission of New York v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263.

Affirmed.

THOMAS, SHERIFF AND COLLECTOR, ET AL. v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 303. Argued March 9, 12, 1923.—Decided April 9, 1923.

- The legislature of a State may, if consistent with its constitution, establish a drainage district, set the boundaries, and apportion the cost by fixing the bases of assessment and taxation; and its conclusion that lands will be benefited cannot be assailed under the Fourteenth Amendment unless palpably arbitrary or discriminatory. P. 483.
- 2. A portion of the franchise of a railroad may be included as real estate within such a district; and, to justify its assessment, the benefit need not be direct, and may consist of gains to be derived from increased traffic due to the improvement. *Id*.
- But vague speculation as to future increased traffic receipts will not justify a basis of taxation which necessarily produces manifest inequality. P. 484.

277 Fed. 708, affirmed.